

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
-----038497 071113Z /21

R 071015Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 887  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
USINT BAGHDAD POUCH  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
AMEMBASSY RABAT  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 KUWAIT 2728

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, XF, KU  
SUBJECT: KUWAITI EFFORTS TO PROMOTE AN ARAB SUMMIT  
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REF: STATE 114888

1. SUMMARY. DURING A MAY 6 MEETING WITH THE CROWN PRINCE/  
PRIME MINISTER, I EXPLORED THE GOK AND OTHER ARAB EFFORTS  
TO ORGANIZE AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING TO PROMOTE ARAB UNITY,  
WHICH WOULD FEATURE, IN SOME FASHION, THE ABANDONMENT BY

SADAT OF HIS CURRENT PEACE STRATEGY. I STRESSED THE DEEP US COMMITMENT TO THE PURSUANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS AND EXPRESSED USG OPPOSITION TO ANY STEPS WHICH WOULD BRING THIS TO A HALT. THE PRIME MINISTER REACTED SHARPLY TO THIS POSITION, ASKING WHAT THE US EXPECTED SADAT TO DO IN THE FACE OF ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AND THE APPARENT INABILITY OF THE USG TO BRING ANY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ISRAEL TO TAKE REASONABLE POSITIONS IN THIS MATTER. I EXPLAINED THAT WE REGARDED THIS CURRENT SITUATION AS A TEMPORARY IMPASSE AND SUGGESTED THAT SUFFICIENT TIME BE ALLOWED FOR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS TO HAVE HOPEFULLY A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY.

2. IN A MAY 6 MEETING WITH CROWN PRINCE/PRIME MINISTER, SHAIKH SA'AD AL-ABDULLAH, I MENTIONED THE SUBJECT OF GOK ACTIVITY IN TRYING TO ORGANIZE AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING TO PROMOTE ARAB UNITY. I OBSERVED ALSO THAT KING HUSSEIN WAS ACTIVE IN THIS SAME REGARD. I WONDERED WHAT SORT OF COMPROMISE THEY HAD IN MIND TO BRING PRESIDENTS SADAT AND ASAD TOGETHER, WHICH WAS OBVIOUSLY A KEY CONDITION TO THE HOLDING OF ANY SUMMIT MEETING.

3. SHAIKH SA'AD NOTED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHAIKH SABAH AL-AHMAD HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE RECENT KHARTOUM MEETING, TOGETHER WITH SAUDI ARABIA, JORDAN AND POSSIBLY NORTH YEMEN, WITH SUDANESE PRESIDENT NIMEIRI WHO HAD BEEN  
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DELEGATED BY THE ARAB LEAGUE TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING SUCH AN ARAB UNITY SUMMIT. NIMEIRI HAD RECENTLY MET WITH SADAT IN ALEXANDRIA AND WAS NOW IN DAMASCUS TO TALK TO ASAD. WHILE THE GOK DID NOT YET HAVE ANY REPORTS ON THESE MEETINGS, IT EXPECTED THEM WITHIN A FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, SHAIKH SA'AD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ALEXANDRIA MEETING HAD GONE WELL.

4. I COMMENTED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT SUCH A SUMMIT MEETING COULD ONLY BE HELD IF THERE WERE SOME ASSURANCE THAT SADAT WOULD ABANDON HIS CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. SHAIKH SA'AD REPLIED THAT SADAT WOULD NOT HAVE TO ADMIT FAILURE OF HIS EFFORTS, BUT HE BELIEVED THAT SOME FELICITOUS STATEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD SATISFY ALL CONCERNED WITHOUT REFLECTING UNFAVORABLY UPON SADAT.

5. I THEN STATED THAT THE USG WOULD CONSIDER IT MOST UNFORTUNATE IF SADAT WERE FORCED TO ABANDON HIS CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WHICH WE CONSIDERED AN

EXTREMELY IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH IN THIS AFFAIR. I SAID MY GOVERNMENT WAS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO DO ALL IT COULD TO FURTHER THIS PEACE PROCESS AND WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED TO SEE IT CURTAILED AT THIS STAGE.

6. SHAIKH SA'AD REACTED RATHER SHARPLY TO THIS PRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION, ASKING WHAT THE USG EXPECTED SADAT TO DO IN THE FACE OF COMPLETE ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE AS DISPLAYED BY PRIME MINISTER BEGIN. SADAT HAD PUT FULL RELIANCE ON THE USG AND WHAT DID HE HAVE TO SHOW FOR IT? HOW WAS HE TO MAKE FURTHER PROGRESS IN HIS PEACE EFFORTS IF PRES. CARTER WAS UNABLE TO BRING ANY PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE ISRAELIS TO ACT RESPONSIBLY IN THIS SITUATION? SADAT WAS IN A VERY  
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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 KUWAIT 2728

EXDIS

DIFFICULT POLITICAL POSITION AT THIS TIME AND HIS  
OPPOSITION WAS BENEFITING FROM RECENT EGYPTIAN DEMOCRATIC  
LIBERALIZATION TO GENERATE ATTACKS AGAINST HIM.

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7. IN MY RESPONSE, I OBSERVED THAT, WHILE THE SITUATION  
ON THE SURFACE LOOKED AS IF IT HAD REACHED A TEMPORARY  
IMPASSE, THERE WERE OTHER DEVELOPMENTS TAKING PLACE  
THAT COULD SERVE TO PROMOTE FURTHER THE PEACE PROCESS.  
I POINTED TO THE RECENT REACTION TO BEGIN'S POLICIES  
WHICH WAS BUILDING UP IN ISRAEL ITSELF. I ALSO NOTED  
THAT THERE WAS GROWING SUPPORT IN US PUBLIC OPINION FOR  
SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE AND FOR THE ROLE WHICH THE CARTER  
ADMINISTRATION WAS SEEKING TO PLAY IN ITS SUPPORT. I  
REITERATED THAT THE USG WAS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THIS  
ROLE AND WOULD REGARD ABANDONMENT OF SADAT'S PEACE EFFORTS  
AS A SERIOUS MATTER. AFTER ALL, WHAT WERE THE ARAB  
ALTERNATIVES -- EITHER TO DO NOTHING OR TO PREPARE FOR  
WAR. THE FIRST WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH THEIR OBJECTIVE,  
AND WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT WARS NEVER PROVIDED A REAL  
SOLUTION AND ONLY CAUSE SUFFERING TO THE PEOPLES INVOLVED.  
THEREFORE, I URGED THE GOK AND ITS ARAB BROTHERS  
TO GIVE THE PEACE PROCESS THE TIME IT NEEDED TO ACHIEVE  
ITS EVENTUAL OBJECTIVES. I RECALLED THAT, WHEN HE  
GENEVA CONFERENCE LOOKED LIKE IT WAS AN IMMINENT  
POSSIBILITY, I HAD IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR GOK  
OFFICIALS EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT IT WOULD TAKE AT  
LEAST TWO YEARS TO REACH A POSSIBLE SOLUTION OF THE  
ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLEM. HE SADAT INITIATIVE HAD BEEN  
UNDERWAY ONLY SIX MONTHS OR SO AND SHOULD BE GIVEN A  
FULL AND PROPER CHANCE TO ACHIEVE ITS GOAL.

8. COMMENT: THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
PEACE PROCESS DESCRIBED IN REFTEL IS HARDLY REASSURING  
TO THE KUWAITIS, WHO SEE NO LIGHT AT THE END OF THE  
TUNNEL. MOREOVER, ONE OF THEIR OWN BASIC FOREIGN POLICY  
PRINCIPLES IS THE MAINTENANCE OF ARAB UNITY, AND THE

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PRESENT SPLIT IN THE ARAB WORLD THEREFORE CAUSES THEM  
CONSIDERABLE UNEASINESS. NEVERTHELESS, I HAD THE  
FEELING THAT SHAIKH SA'AD WAS SOMEWHAT IMPRESSED BY  
MY DIRECT PRESENTATION OF THE US POSITION RE LIMITING  
THE PEACE PROCESS. I THINK, THOUGH, THAT THE  
CONTINUATION OF THIS PROCESS AT THIS STAGE WILL  
PROBABLY OCCURE MORE BECAUSE OF ARAB INABILITY TO AGREE  
ON A FORMULA FOR RESTORING UNITY RATHER THAN AS THE  
RESULT OF OUR REPRESENTATIONS. I AM SEEKING AN APPOINT-D  
MENT WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER BEFORE MY DEPARTURE FOR  
WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS AND INTEND TO MAKE A PRESENTA-  
TION OF THE POINTS CONTAINED IN THE REFTEL TO HIM.  
MAESTRONE

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## Message Attributes

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**Concepts:** POLICIES, ARAB STATES, SUMMIT MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 07 may 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Executive Order:** GS  
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**Film Number:** D780194-0571  
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